REFORMING THE UNITED NATIONS
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INTRODUCTION: The United Nations was founded by the *victorious powers at the end of World War ll to make the world a safer and better place. In the early years, the US and other western powers ran the United Nations and its proliferating agencies as a western club. The US made it clear time and again that the world organization should make an adjunct of its policy. The same was true, of course, of the other Western permanent members and the former Soviet Union. With the end of the cold war and the beginning of the non-ideological phase in world diplomacy, a new era has opened upon the United Nations history. DEVELOPMENT OF THOUGHT:Â With the end of them! told War” and the consequent increasing evidence of big power unanimity, the UN has started playing the role envisaged for it in the charter in the political and security sphere. It has been particularly active In, conflict-management and providing humanitarian assistance. This has naturally given rise to the hope that it would resume its charter functions In the economic and social spheres also. |
There is an enhanced perception of the vital link between security and development. It is recognized that more often than not economic backwardness is at the root of political instability and social conflicts and that economic growth and prosperity can go a long way towards bolstering security. It has, however, to be recognized that though development is a key component of security, It is also important by itself.
Every Institution has to change to cope with an ever-changing environment and new challenges and opportunities. The UN is no exception to this general pattern of institutional adaptation. At the present juncture change and adaptation have become imperative for the UN because of the sweeping dimensions of the recent changes in the world and the rapidity with which they have followed each other. A large number of proposals have therefore been made recently, especially for the restructuring of the economic condition and that of the UN.
 The Bosnian conflict has put a question mark or’ the credibility of the UN. Can it protect weaker nations from their powerful adversaries? Particularly at a time when a power vacuum has been created due to the collapse of the Soviet Union, America is unwilling to take on the leadership of the world, and the NATO remains ineffective outside its jurisdiction.
 The Third World countries can now enter the fray and make the UN a safe haven for the protection of human rights as well as the protection of the integrity of smaller and weaker nations for ensuring global economic development and environmental protection.
For this purpose, a reform in the United Nations is needed not only because of power vacuum but also to change its course in the post-Cold War world. This cannot be done without the recommendation of the Security Council. Structural changes in the UN will inevitably be considered soon as major powers, like Japan, and continents, like Africa, seek permanent seats in the Security Council, and others, like Taiwan, seek admission to the UN under new circumstances.
 With the ending of the Cold War, the Security Council has acquired, to a considerable extent, the role which was envisaged for it by the architects of the Charter. In all conflict resolutions in the recent past, the Security Council has played a key role except in the case of Panama. Over the last few years the exclusive informal meetings of the five permanent members to work out a line of the policy of unanimous concurrence–essential for any decision by the Council — have been more frequent. However, ever since the number of elected members was raised to 10 in 1966, unanimity constitutes for the five, four affirmative votes for a decision as compared to two in the original arrangement.
The question of revising the membership of the Security Council gained momentum again in the last few years. In light of this, many UN members have expressed the view that the Security Council be reshaped to reflect today’s world. The question acquired an urgency ever since the Security Council, at the beginning of August 1990, increasingly resorted to the enforcement measures of Chapter VII of the Charter.
 The existing pattern of representation in the Security Council has become extremely lopsided in view of the radical political changes and the coming together of the East and West of Europe. Thus the Europeans and others now have seven seats, four permanent and three non-permanent. The Third World countries, pressing for equal representation, are seeking further expansion of Security Council members on the basis of an equitable geographical distribution of seats. Furthermore, both Japan and Germany, who are now among the top four contributors to the UN budget, would like to find a place among the permanent members of the Council. Japan currently contributes more than 12 per cent of the budget. Germany’s annual assessed contribution to the United Nations, as of now, is considerably larger than either that of France or Britain. The question is what the criteria for permanent membership should be; whether on the basis of economic power or population. There is also a strong view that Brazil, India and Nigeria, by virtue of being the largest countries of their respective regions, should become permanent members. This proposal, plausible, would mean adding five new permanent members—Japan, Germany, r Brazil, India and Nigeria. Unlike the present members, however, no new member is to possess the veto power. If the proposal is accepted there would b categories of members: Five veto-wielding permanent members; five members without veto; and a number of elected non-permanent members.
It is obvious that whatever the nature of the reforms and reshaping of the membership of the Security Council be, the opposition will come from those affected.
Intriguingly enough, when the disintegration of the Soviet Union took place and the Soviet seat was quietly passed on to the Russian Federation, no one raised an objection. It was obvious that the five existing permanent members did not care to share the right to veto with what could have been an additional member. Furthermore, as no revision of the Charter is possible without the concurrence of each of the five, it is difficult to predict how the negotiations for expansion will emerge in the years to come. What is clear is that there will be resistance to change, but the continuing expansion of the Security Council’s role, especially in the area of enforcement measures makes reforms desirable. As noted earlier, the Council should be enlarged so that decisions are not imposed at the behest of the United Nations, by a select few.
The frequent use of veto power in the Security Council has resulted in off-repeated calls for the abolition of the veto; however, the veto problem cannot be solved by any revision of the Charter, because of the opposition of the great powers to such amendment. Under the circumstances, it is desirable that the permanent members of the Security Council should accept certain voluntary restrictions on their rights to veto decisions of the Security Council. Further, the veto should be used only on vital issues and procedural matters should be immune from it. It is also desirable that the veto should be eliminated with respect to the admission of new members and the peaceful settlement of disputes.
 The decline in respect for General Assembly resolutions, where the majority consists largely of very small states, is a fact of life and with the further influx of tiny states into the UN is posing a serious problem. The oft-proposed solution, the introduction of a system of weighted voting, is difficult to implement: The majority of over-represented small states are hardly likely to agree to give up their present privileged position. Nor would even the basic principles of any such scheme be easy to agree upon by all states. Would it be based on population, on a gross national product, on contributions to the UN or what? Yet the ultimate choice seems to be between a limited measure of weighted voting or a decline in the importance attached to UN resolutions. if no change is made the effect will be to reduce the influence of the assembly and to enhance the role of the Security Council.
 A global law enforcement role for the UN should be elaborated focusing on the role of sanctions and military enforcement measures. There must be a clear understanding of the enforcement measures, their sequencing and timing that can be implemented by the international community when international law has been violated. As military measures may sometimes become necessary, the potential of the Military Staff. Committee of the Security Council should be reviewed. This committee, practically dormant during the years of the cold war, could play; a significantly more important role in the future. The role of UN peace-keeping forces should also be expanded. They should not only deal with monitoring ceasefires and other means of ending or containing conflicts but could ‘also be used to ensure that countries are not destabilized across frontiers. Then, is a need for securing agreement in principle on the form these forces should take and how they should be controlled by the Security Council: they should play a neutral al political role within the country where they are operating; financing should where possible be under the regular budget but on a special scale. The possibility of a permanent peacekeeping fund should be explored. Meanwhile, the voluntary earmarking of forces and greater cooperation and coordination in training such forces could continue.
 The UN should have a permanent fund to make its financial position secure. Whether the 1986 agreement under which “consensus” will be required for all budgetary decisions will permanently solve all financial problems of the UN is yet to be seen. “Consensus” in effect means that each state has a veto. Everything will depend on the way compromises are worked out. If the developed’ states choose to use their veto power unreasonably to prevent even moderate increases in the UN budget, or if developing countries continually try to push ‘through proposals leading to unreasonable budgetary expansion. the problems will remain unsolved. This will continue as! One as the UN does not have a system of raising revenues independently for its activities.
It is necessary to improve the capacity of the United Nations to coordinate a large number of social and economic activities now being carried out by its organs and specialized agencies. The existing coordinating bodies (ACC and ECOSOC) have only marginal influence over the UN system.
 The need for a coordinated macro-economic policy response at the global level to restore the balance of the world economy has been widely recognised. The present arrangement for such coordination under G-7 is clearly unsatisfactory because it excludes the developing countries and, 5esides, it has until now proved ineffective. The UN, by virtue of its mandate, is in a particularly advantageous position to undertake the task of such coordination. The ECOSOC should play a central role in shaping policies for macro-economic coordination at the global level, as envisaged in the charter.
 The office of the Secretary-General is another UN institution which has aroused considerable enthusiasm for reform towards building up a ‘leadership role’. It should be noted that in the context of the ongoing exercise for reform of the administrative and financial functioning of the United Nations, there has been no official proposal for reviewing the role of the Secretary-General.
The role of the Secretary-General has also been greatly modified by a liberal interpretation of the UN Charter. His role has been indicated in Articles 97-100. A quick reading of these articles will give the impression that the Secretary-General is merely the chief administrative officer of the United Nations possessing the authority to appoint his staff and has not been vested with any important political functions. But in practice, the Secretary-General has come to exercise great influence in the United Nations. Reforms here are aimed at the selection process and or a fixed term of appointment of seven years.
The attempt seems to be to change the practice followed for the last four decades based on the recommendations of the Preparatory Commission (1945-46), which proposed that the Secretary-General be selected for an initial period of five years from among nationals other than those of the five permanent members of the Security Council. The process of selection throughout has consisted of the Security Council holding closed meetings to select a candidate. Once unanimity on a choice is reached among the Big Five, the selection is generally endorsed by the other members of the Security Council and by being General Assembly. What was being proposed was a seven-year term instead of five and that a non-political committee should undertake the task of world-wide, political search to find a competent executive. The choice of the then Secretary-General Dr Boutrous Boutrous Ghali who took over in Jan. 1992 was seen as a triumph for the Third World in general and Africa in particular. Africa was the only continent from which a Secretary-General had not been chosen until now even though Africa’s fifty-one members constituted a third of UN membership.
 It is generally agreed that the UN should try to become far more effective than it is today by acting on what its Charter has described as “a centre for harmonizing the interests of nations”. It should be better equipped to enable it to become such a centre. The UN is not yet what it was once hoped to be—a world government, which can decide what nations should do and instruct them accordingly. What it can do, if properly used, is to modify inter-state relations by maximizing the asset which it does possess: its influence. It can act as a guide, as an authority, and above all as a focus for discussion and contacts. If it uses the authority it already has in the most effective way, it might be able to bring significant long-term changes in the attitudes and policies of governments. The general direction in which the UN should seek to move is towards anticipation of potential conflicts, promotion of negotiation and the formulation of general norms of international behaviour. It is in this context that the UN should undertake specific changes in structure and procedures to bring about such a movement:
